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The move towards an intersectional approach

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Multiple grounds in equality and human rights jurisprudence

Some courts and tribunals have started to acknowledge the need to make special provision for discrimination based on multiple grounds and to recognize the social, economic and historical context in which it takes place. However, despite these advancements, the courts’ understanding of a proper intersectional approach is still in its infancy. What follows is a discussion of recent cases in which a move towards a multiple grounds or intersectional analysis is evidenced in either a majority or dissenting opinion.

Supreme Court of Canada

Recently, decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada have included comments on multiple grounds of discrimination and intersecting grounds. In some of these decisions, the social context and life experiences of persons who suffer discrimination are discussed. The perspective of the individual is reaffirmed.

Writing for the minority in the Mossop case, Madam Justice L’Heureux-Dubé remarked, “it is increasingly recognized that categories of discrimination may overlap, and that individuals may suffer historical exclusion on the basis of both race and gender, age and physical handicap or some other combination.” She further commented that:

...categorizing such discrimination as primarily racially oriented, or primarily gender-oriented, misconceives the reality of discrimination as it is experienced by individuals. Discrimination may be experienced on many grounds, and where this is the case, it is not really meaningful to assert that it is one or the other. It may be more realistic to recognize that both forms of discrimination may be present and intersect.

She went on to comment on the way to deal with multiple forms of discrimination where both grounds are prohibited:

On a practical level, where both forms of discrimination are prohibited, one can ignore the complexity of the interaction, and characterize the discrimination as one type or the other. The person is protected from discrimination in either event.

However, though multiple levels of discrimination may exist, multiple levels of protection may not. There are situations where a person suffers discrimination on more than one ground, but where only one form of discrimination is a prohibited ground. When faced with such situations, one should be cautious not to characterize the discrimination so as to deprive the person of any protection. ... One should not lightly allow a characterization which excludes those from the scope of the Act who should legitimately be included.[46]

While being generally positive about L’Heureux-Dubé’s J.’s recognition of intersecting grounds of discrimination, many commentators have been critical of her suggestion that where both forms of discrimination are prohibited, one can just select one of the grounds. This represents a return to the traditional single ground focused approach and does not reflect an intersectional analysis. This comment likely arose owing to the facts of the case and L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s words nevertheless represent an important first step in recognizing the intersection of multiple grounds.

In a subsequent decision, Egan, L’Heureux-Dubé J., once again in a dissenting opinion, reiterated that categories of discrimination cannot be reduced to watertight compartments, but rather will often overlap in significant measure. Awareness of, and sensitivity to, the realities of those experiencing discrimination is an important task that judges must undertake when evaluating the impact of the distinction on members of an affected group.[47]

More recently, in its majority decision in Law v. Canada[48], the Supreme Court recognized that a discrimination claim can present an intersection of grounds that are a synthesis of those listed in s. 15(1) or are analogous to them:

... it is open to a claimant to articulate a discrimination claim under more than one of the enumerated and analogous grounds. Such an approach to the grounds of discrimination accords with the essential purposive and contextual nature of equality analysis under s. 15(1) of the Charter. Where a party brings a discrimination claim on the basis of a newly postulated analogous ground, or on the basis of a combination of different grounds, this part of the discrimination inquiry must focus upon the issue of whether and why a ground or confluence of grounds is analogous to those listed in s. 15 (1). This determination is made on the basis of a complete analysis of the purpose of s. 15(1), the nature and situation of the individual or group at issue, and the social, political and legal history of Canadian society’s treatment of the group. A ground or grounds will not be considered analogous under s. 15 (1) unless it can be shown that differential treatment premised on the ground or grounds has the potential to bring into play human dignity.... If the court determines that recognition of a ground or confluence of grounds as analogous would serve to advance the fundamental purpose of s. 15(1), the ground or grounds will then be so recognized.[49]

The Court further stated:

There is no reason in principle, therefore, why a discrimination claim positing an intersection of grounds cannot be understood as analogous to, or as a synthesis of, the grounds listed in s. 15 (1).[50]

Subsequent to Law, the Supreme Court applied this analysis to recognize a new analogous ground of discrimination, namely “aboriginality-residence.” In Corbiére v. Canada[51] the court considered a provision of the Indian Act which barred band members who live off-reserve from voting in band elections. In establishing the new analogous ground the court noted that the group experiencing differential treatment was based on a combination of traits, namely being Aboriginal persons who are band members but living off a reserve. L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s decision also noted the particular adverse impact that the impugned law had on Aboriginal women because of the history of their involuntary loss of Indian status:

Aboriginal women, who can be said to be doubly disadvantaged on the basis of both sex and race, are among those particularly affected by legislation relating to off-reserve band members, because of their history and circumstances in Canadian and Aboriginal society.[52][Emphasis Added.]

Furthermore, in describing whether recognition of an analogous ground will further the purposes of s. 15(1) of the Charter, L’Heureux-Dubé J. noted:

The second stage [of the s. 15(1) inquiry] must therefore be flexible enough to adapt to stereotyping, prejudice, or denials of human dignity and worth that might occur in specific ways for specific groups of people, to recognize that personal characteristics may overlap or intersect (such as race, band membership, and place of residence in this case), and to reflect changing social phenomena or new or different forms of stereotyping or prejudice.[53]

The decision places a significant emphasis on a contextual approach that recognizes stereotyping, prejudice or denials of human dignity may occur in specific ways for specific groups of people and that personal characteristics may overlap or intersect.

The inability to recognize new analogous grounds under the Code does not mean that these Supreme Court of Canada cases are inapplicable to the Commission’s work. Rather they represent an important first step in acknowledging that grounds are not rigid, watertight compartments and in signalling a move towards an intersectional and contextualized approach. As the approach to human rights and Charter cases should be as congruous as possible[54], this evolution in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence signals a need for human rights bodies to follow by applying existing grounds in a manner that most promotes an intersectional approach.

Courts and Tribunals

Several notable decisions recognizing the relationship between multiple grounds have come out of Canadian courts and human rights tribunals.

One of the earliest and most significant decisions is that of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in Dartmouth/Halifax County Regional Housing Authority v. Sparks[55]. In that case, the court recognized that in considering whether legislation has a discriminatory effect, regard must be had to the characteristics shared by persons comprising the group adversely affected. The Court recognized that discrimination is the combined effect of multiple factors, including poverty:

As a general proposition persons who qualify for public housing are the economically disadvantaged and are so disadvantaged because of their age and correspondingly low incomes (seniors) or families with low incomes, a majority of whom are disadvantaged because they are single female parents on social assistance, many of whom are black [sic]. The public housing tenants group as a whole is historically disadvantaged as a result of the combined effect of several personal characteristics listed in s. 15(1).[56] [Emphasis Added.]

In a significant Ontario human rights case, Kearney v. Bramalea Ltd. (No. 2)[57] a very similar approach was followed but in the context of a complaint under the Code. The case involved the use of rent-to-income ratios to determine eligibility for rental accommodation. Expert witnesses provided the board of inquiry with evidence that the rent-to-income ratios operated to exclude certain socially disadvantaged groups who were statistically more likely to never meet the required ratio. The statistical evidence presented noted the particular situation of persons who present an intersection of grounds, such as single mothers, young single women, single First Nations women, single Black women, single South Asian women, single women from Africa, non-citizen female single parents and unattached women on social assistance.

The tribunal accepted evidence that the use of criteria had a disparate impact on individuals based on their age, sex, race, family status, marital status, citizenship, place of origin and the receipt of public assistance. The tribunal acknowledged that the evidence presented noted the importance of recognizing that many “groups” intersect and overlap substantially.[58] The tribunal found discrimination on the basis of every ground cited in each complaint. For example, in the case of Catarina Luis, a single Black mother, a refugee from Angola, and in receipt of family benefits assistance, the board concluded discrimination on the basis of race, sex, marital status, family status, citizenship, place of origin and receipt of public assistance.

In the subsequent decision of Vander Schaaf, the board of inquiry once again reverted to an approach that primarily looked at the alleged grounds of discrimination, namely age, sex and marital status, in isolation instead of giving full consideration to their intersectional effect. In another recent decision in which the complainant, a single mother on social assistance, alleged she was denied rental accommodation because of her source of income and her marital and family status, the tribunal noted that “in order to prove her complaint, the complainant need only establish that one or more of these grounds was one of the factors in the respondent’s denial of tenancy”.[59] While this approach may be technically accurate, it tends to negate the complexity of discrimination faced by groups such as single mothers in receipt of social assistance. It should, therefore, only be followed where evidence supports only one ground and not where the discrimination is clearly based on an intersection of grounds. In those cases, all grounds should be recognized, investigated and, if there is evidence to warrant, sent to a board on the totality of grounds.

In Falkiner v. Ontario (Ministry of Community and Social Services, Income Maintenance Branch), the Ontario Divisional Court followed Sparks and Corbiére to find that “the recognition of the Respondents as members of a group suffering discrimination by reason of their status as sole support mothers on social assistance, a basis analogous to the enumerated grounds, would advance the fundamental purpose of s. 15(1), the protection of human dignity.”[60]

In Irshad (Litigation guardian of) v. Ontario (Minister of Health)[61], the Court recognized that the reason the claimants were not eligible for OHIP coverage, the basis for the Charter claim, was not because they were disabled or immigrants, but because they were immigrants with a disability. Had they not been disabled they would have been able to satisfy the medical requirements under the Immigration Act and thereby entitled to OHIP coverage. Had they been born in Ontario they would also have been entitled even with the same disabilities. Despite this acknowledgement of the effect of the intersection of grounds, the court’s decision to dismiss the Charter challenge lacked an assessment of the intersectionality of the grounds of disability and immigration status. On appeal, the Court accepted that but for their disabilities, the claimants would have been eligible for OHIP. However, it concluded that the eligibility criteria used by Ontario were based on immigration status. It was the federal immigration authorities who decided that physical disabilities rendered the claimants ineligible for landed immigrant status. The adverse effect caused by selecting criteria, namely immigration status, that were based on disability, was not considered.

In Rivers v. Squamish Indian Council,[62] the tribunal examined a discrimination claim based on more than one enumerated ground. The complainant, an Aboriginal woman whose national and ethnic origin was Gitskan, alleged that she was discriminated against because she was a “married in” as opposed to a blood born member of the Squamish Band and was not connected to one of the “chiefly families.”[63] The dissenting member of the tribunal recognized that the complaint was based on multiple grounds i.e. national/ethnic status and family status and stated that the alleged grounds had been analyzed separately but that the two grounds are very closely related and in fact overlap.[64] While indicating that the dimension of the interaction of multiple grounds or the concept of intersectionality would be relied upon, the dissenting member then proceeded to analyze the case by dealing with each ground in turn rather than dealing with the effect of their intersection. This type of approach illustrates the desire on the part of decision-makers to acknowledge an intersectional approach despite the fact that they are, in some instances, unsure how to apply an intersectional analysis to the facts.

One case provides an excellent example of a tribunal expressly recognizing the intersection of race and sex in finding discrimination. In Frank v. A.J.R. Enterprises Ltd. (c.o.b. “Nelson Place Hotel”),[65] the majority of the clientele of the respondent’s hotel was Aboriginal. However, the complainant and other Aboriginal women found themselves evicted from their rooms or denied service at the lounge on several occasions. The respondent sought to argue that as it primarily served Aboriginal persons, it would not have discriminated against the complainant. (Essentially the respondent argued that as it does not discriminate against other Aboriginal persons, it could not have discriminated against the complainant.) The tribunal looked at the historical context of the treatment of Aboriginal persons in Canada: is not inconceivable for an agency, a business, a nation, or a people, to maintain business dealings with a people it holds in contempt and to blatantly discriminate against it or a class within it.... To hold Native people in contempt while taking every dollar from them is not an unheard of business practice in our history. The Respondent’s actions and practices, to say the least, smack of this negative attitude toward aboriginal women as a class of people.[66] [Emphasis Added.]

The tribunal took offence to the respondent’s insinuation that the complainant was a prostitute: “What is particularly offensive about this is the assumption that she is a prostitute because she is a single Native woman in a hotel by herself”.[67] The tribunal used strong language about the intersection of race and sex and compensated the complainant for the indignity of both race and sex discrimination:

I recognize that this is not the platform for me to pontificate about the evils of sexism and racism, but suffice it to say that sexism and racism do often intersect to the degree that sometimes one is unsure which of these two forces is at work. Nevertheless, I wish to draw attention to the magnitude of the complaint, to the intersection of sex and race discrimination which, in my view, is the essence of this complaint, and to the indignity suffered by the Complaint. I also wish to draw attention to the fact that that attitude and conduct of the Respondent seems to me to reflect a pattern of malignant and contemptuous sexism intertwined with callous racism and disregard for the basic dignity, humanity and feelings of aboriginal women.[68] [Emphasis Added.]

Increasingly, tribunals and courts are recognizing a need for an intersectional analysis. After having acknowledged the need for an intersectional approach, courts and tribunals are meeting with varying degrees of success in applying such an analysis to the determination of whether discrimination has occurred. In some cases, the analysis takes into account the effect of the existence of multiple grounds, while in others the decision-makers tend to revert back to a sequential analysis of each ground in isolation. Nevertheless, some significant developments have occurred and include: (1) a recognition by the Supreme Court that an intersection of grounds can be recognized as a new analogous ground where social context, historical disadvantage and essential human dignity are involved,[69] (2) the application of a contextual analysis, focusing on society’s response to the individual and it’s construction of identity, that includes examination of historical disadvantage, social, political and cultural context and socio-economic issues,[70] (3) the use of statistical evidence to illustrate the particular circumstances of groups identified by an intersection of grounds,[71] (4) findings of discrimination based on all the grounds that make up a complainant’s identity and not just those that are the least complex or controversial,[72] and (5) the rejection of individuals or groups that are identified by some but not all of the same grounds as the complainant as being inappropriate for comparison to the complainant.[73]


Although courts and tribunals have acknowledged the reality of discrimination on more than one ground, there are no clear directions on dealing with remedies in these types of claims. There is very little evidence to show that remedies awarded in human rights complaints consider multiple or intersecting grounds of discrimination. While some tribunal decisions acknowledge that discrimination may be experienced at multiple levels, this appears not to be reflected in awards or remedies. For example, although extensive documentation was presented in Kearney on the impact of the landlord’s policy on multiple grounds of discrimination, the remedies did not recognize or address the multiple effects of the discrimination. In Olarte, the court recognized that the respondent took advantage of the particularly vulnerable status of his dependent, immigrant female workers who very much needed work, may not have spoken English and perhaps appeared from their cultural backgrounds to be more likely to subject themselves to male authority. Despite recognizing their particularly disadvantaged status, the remedy given did not acknowledge that more harm may have been occasioned thereby.

In Crozier, the respondent had tried to pursue a sexual relationship with the complainant, a lesbian, by trying to convince her that there were problems with her current sex life that could be remedied by having a heterosexual relationship with him. The tribunal acknowledged that “the respondent’s conduct amounts to harassment because of sexual orientation as well as sexual harassment.”[74] The tribunal relied on an analogy of a hypothetical case between a complainant and respondent of different races and concluded that a similar situation would constitute racial as well as sexual harassment. Counsel for the complainant urged that separate amounts be awarded. While the tribunal accepted that “the element of harassment for sexual orientation adds weight to the sexual harassment committed by the respondent” and that the complainant’s vulnerability was “undoubtedly increased by the fact that as a lesbian, she was a member of a marginalized group”,[75] the tribunal concluded that “the violation of the two provisions of the Code are closely intertwined, and neither one doubles the effect of the other.” [76]

In Egan, L’Heureux-Dubé J. drew an interesting analogy to demonstrate the impact that an act of discrimination can have on different groups:

No one would dispute that two identical projectiles, thrown at the same speed, may nonetheless leave a different scar on two different types of surfaces. Similarly, groups that are more socially vulnerable will experience the adverse effects of a legislative distinction more vividly than if the same distinction were directed at a group which is not similarly socially vulnerable.[77]

Similarly in Sparks, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal looked at the impact of Ms Spark’s characteristics (a person of colour [Black], a woman, a sole support mother, a social assistance recipient, a subsidized tenant, and a poor person) and the disadvantaging effect of the legislative provisions in question, in a global and cumulative way – the way in which Irma Sparks herself experienced them.[78]

In Ghosh v. Domglas[79], a complaint of harassment because of disability, the tribunal introduced the issue of race, although this was not alleged in the complaint, to note that this may have had an effect on the injury suffered:

...while there is nothing to suggest that Mr. Ghosh was harassed because of his race, in considering damages it is to be considered that the wrongdoer takes his victim as he finds him. His membership in a visible minority may have had nothing to do with the harassment, but I have no doubt that that fact was a subjective element in increasing his vulnerability and anguish...[80]

As the aim of human rights remedies is, in part, to restore the person to the position she would have been in if the discrimination had not occurred, the damage to the person as a result of the discrimination is a critical factor to consider. In this regard, L’Heureux-Dubé’s acknowledgement that persons who are more socially vulnerable will experience greater impact is significant for the purposes of determining remedies for multiple and intersecting discrimination. Therefore, while in some cases, a more significant award may not be warranted, there may be some situations in which the particular vulnerability of the person, as a result of the intersectionality of grounds, should be acknowledged in the damages for injured dignity, mental anguish and so forth.[81] It could be another factor to be considered in determining the extent of the complainant’s injury as a result of the discrimination or harassment.

Aside from monetary compensation, a Task Force on Gender Equality in the Legal Profession (the “Task Force”) has suggested that the best way of remedying and preventing systemic discrimination (multiple grounds discrimination being one component) is through the equality principles of affirmative action and the human rights principle of the duty to accommodate.[82] The Task Force notes that equality rights law, which applies the contextual approach, provides the rationale for affirmative action programs that “acknowledge that existing social and legal arrangements have actively benefited certain groups and disadvantaged others... [and] aim to restore the balance.”[83] The Code allows historical disadvantage to be remedied on a proactive basis through special programs (s. 14), designed to relieve hardship or economic disadvantage faced by disadvantaged persons or groups.

The duty to accommodate is also a central principle in human rights law and can result in institutional policies, practices and standards being transformed to respond to the needs of different groups. [84] The Supreme Court’s decision in British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. BCGSEU has noted the need for employers, service providers and others to design neutral rules and standards in a way that is as inclusive as possible.[85] This could include a consideration of persons who are identified by an intersection of grounds. Possible remedies could therefore include requiring respondents to establish standards that provide for individual accommodation of persons who present with complex identities.

Academic research on multiple and intersecting identities

Recognizing the need to address the fact that people’s unique experience of discrimination may not be captured by a single ground focused human rights approach, researchers and academics have suggested the use of an intersectional analysis.

Several authors have examined the issue of multiple and intersecting identities and their relationship to people’s experience in the social, economic, political and legal environment. Several socio-economic reports and research studies documenting individuals’ experiences in society, the workplace and other social spheres highlight the importance of multiple factors that constitute identities and recognize its importance not only in human rights discourse but in human rights policy development as well. Esmeralda Thornhill,[86] Nitya Iyer (formerly Duclos),[87] Emily Carasco,[88] and Carol A. Aylward[89] are several scholars who have studied the issue of the intersection of race and gender and have written about the situation of individuals who confront multiple grounds of disadvantage. Celia Rothenberg,[90] writing about the Palestinian community in Toronto, notes the diversity among Palestinian women and observes that the differences among women’s lives are “not entirely due to individual idiosyncrasies or circumstances. Rather, these women’s lives provide illustrations of how larger socio-economic factors play themselves out within the Palestinian community.”[91] Pointing to the differing political viewpoints and religious identities, she writes that it is important for policy makers and analysts of culture to recognize diversity, rather than rely on generalizations.

In an article explaining the need for educator sensitivity to the connections between race, gender and social class, Goli Rezai-Rashti[92] writes about the tendency of equity issues to be compartmentalized or discussed as separate subjects with the result that a systematic analysis of the relational nature of gender, race and social class is lost to teachers and students. In addition, Rezai-Rashti describes a lack of cultural sensitivity or of an understanding of the complexity of equity issues as alienating minority-students. For example, Rezai-Rashti writes of a group of female Muslim Somali students who felt that “because of their socio-economic status, race, culture, religion, and, last but not least, their gender, they were perceived by other students, and sometimes by their teachers, as inherently inferior in terms of a pseudo-hierarchical order with other cultural and religious groups in their school. Because of their religion (Islam) and gender, they came to believe that other students thought of them as submissive, obedient, oppressed, and even mutilated individuals incapable of experiencing any sort of sexual pleasure”.[93] The students reported that a 1995 CBC program on female genital mutilation generated racism in their school and contributed to creating an environment that made it easier for other students to “persist in their harassment” because the information presented was “decontextualized” and demeaned their culture and background.[94]

In Rezai-Rashti’s analysis, many teachers view issues of race, class and culture from an essentialist perspective, i.e. a viewpoint in which women are seen as stable, homogenous and undifferentiated, rather than in a “non-essentialist, unstable, and conflicting way”.[95] According to Rezai-Rashti, an essentialist perspective would label specific cultures as backward because of their oppressive treatment of women, whereas a non-essentialist perspective would help students “develop a more critical understanding of racism, sexism, and class issues across cultures”.[96]

Carl F. Stychin has applied an intersectional analysis in examining nationalism and identity in Canada, focusing on the constitutional recognition of sexual orientation as analogous ground of discrimination[97].

For women with disabilities, an analysis based on intersecting grounds, with its focus on the perspective of the claimant and the contextual approach, would address concerns that their unique experiences are not recognized in human rights procedures and policy development. Diane Pothier, for example, writes that her experiences are defined by the fact that she is a woman with a disability.[98]

The Task Force has written that the legal concept of equality requires consideration of several inter-related concepts: the formal/substantive equality dichotomy; the contextual approach; discrimination and multiple discrimination.[99] The Task Force addresses the issue of multiple discrimination as experienced by female lawyers and describes it as consisting of:

...the cumulative and compounding effect of discrimination based on several group characteristics. It is difficult, if not impossible, to untangle discrimination based on gender and other characteristics such as race...

It is critical to appreciate that the experience of multiple discrimination is different from the experiences of differential treatment based on one ground of discrimination. It is not always easy to appreciate this distinction because of the mainstream perspective on discrimination. ...

Racial and gender discrimination can occur simultaneously and are both rooted in society at large, including the legal and justice systems. Both individual and systemic discrimination can be traced to hardened attitudes and commonly involve rigid stereotypes stressing ethnic differences at the expense of those who cannot confirm to the status quo...

Aboriginal women lawyers also face sexual and racial discrimination in the profession. In addition, they have unique concerns emanating from being First Nation Individuals. ... Similarly lesbians must deal with negative stereotypes and pressure to be like their heterosexual colleagues. ... Women lawyers with disabilities are faced with a great deal of ignorance concerning their ability to function as lawyers.[100]

This is indicative of the increasing use of the concepts of multiple and intersecting identities as a tool to determine how discrimination may be experienced in unique ways.

Finally, in the recent discussions surrounding the potential amendment of the Canadian Human Rights Act, authors have noted the need for investigators and adjudicators to perceive the particularities of discrimination experienced by, for example, Aboriginal women, Black women, women with disabilities, lesbians and single mothers and have suggested that a revised Act should specifically state that:

...the purpose of the Act is to address those forms of discrimination that too easily disappear from view because of the compartmentalization of grounds, that is, overlapping forms of discrimination experienced by Aboriginal women, women of colour, immigrant women, women with disabilities, lesbians, single mothers and older women.[101]

[46]Mossop, supra note 14 at para. 53-54.
[47]Egan, supra note 1 at 563.
[48][1999] 1 S.C.R. 497 [hereinafter Law].
[49]Ibid. at 554-5.
[51][1999] 2 S.C.R. 203 [hereinafter Corbiére].
[52]Ibid. at 259.
[53]Ibid. at 253.
[54]British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. BCGSEU, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 3 [hereinafter “Meiorin”].
[55](1993), 101 D.L.R. (4th) 224 (N.S.C.A.) [hereinafter Sparks].
[56]Ibid. at 234.
[57](1998), 34 C.H.R.R. D/1 (Ont. Bd. Inq.) [hereinafter Kearney]. The decision of the Superior Court of Justice, Divisional Court confirms the Board of Inquiry’s approach and treatment of the expert evidence: Shelter Corp. v. Ontario (Human Rights Comm.) (2001), 39 C.H.R.R. D/111 (Ont. Sup. Ct.).
[58]Kearney, ibid. at D/16.
[59]Birchall v. Guardian Properties Ltd. (2000), 38 C.H.R.R. D/83 at para. 30 (BCHRT).
[60][2000] O.J. No. 2433 (Div. Ct.), online: QL. This decision is under appeal.
[61](1999), 60 C.R.R. (2d) 231 (Ont. Gen. Div.); aff’d 197 D.L.R. (4th) 103 (Ont. C.A.).
[62]Rivers v. Squamish Indian Council, [1994] C.H.R.T. No. 3 No. T.D. 3/94 [hereinafter Rivers].
[63]Ibid. at 93-94.
[64]Ibid. at 97.
[65](1993), 23 C.H.R.R. D/228 (BCCHR) [hereinafter Frank].
[66]Ibid. at D/232.
[67]Ibid. at D/233.
[68]Ibid. at D/234.
[69]Law, surpa note 48 and Corbiére, supra note 52.
[70]Frank, supra note 65, Sparks, supra note 56 and Kearney, supra note 57.
[71]Kearney, ibid.
[72]Kearney, ibid. and Frank, supra note 65.
[73]Frank, ibid. and Corbiére supra note 52.
[74]Supra, note 25 at D/247.
[75]Ibid. at D/248.
[76]Ibid. at D/249.
[77]Egan, supra note 1 at 553.
[78]M. Jackman, “Constitutional Contact with the Disparities in the World: Poverty as a Prohibited Ground of Discrimination Under the Canadian Charter and Human Rights Law” (1994) 2 Review of Constitutional Studies 76 .
[79]Ghosh v. Domglas Inc. (No. 2) (1992), 17 C.H.R.R. D/216 (Ont. Bd. Inq.).
[80]Ibid. at para. 21.
[81]One author has suggested that in the highly discretionary category of compensation for humiliation and suffering (i.e. general damages), the tribunal’s perceptions of all the characteristics of the complainant should come into play; see Disappearing Women, supra note 22 at 41.
[82]Canadian Bar Association Task Force on Gender Equality in the Legal Profession, Touchstones for Change: Equality, Diversity and Accountability (Ottawa: The Canadian Bar Association, 1993) (Chair: The Hon. Bertha Wilson) at 16-17.
[83]Ibid. at 16.
[84]Ibid. at 17.
[85]Supra, note 54 at para. 68.
[86]E. Thornhill, “Regard sur le racisme: Perspectives juridiques à partir d’un vécu noir” (1993) 6 C.J.W.L. 1 and E. Thornhill, “Focus on Racism: Legal Perspectives from a Black Experience” (1994) Currents 8, discussed in C. A. Aylward, Canadian Critical Race Theory: Racism and the Law (Halifax: Fernwood, 1999) at 45.
[87]N. Iyer, “Categorical Denials: Equality Rights and the Shaping of Social Identity” (1993) 19 Queen’s L.J. 179; Disappearing Women, supra, note 22.
[88]A Case of Double Jeopardy: Race and Gender, supra, note 16.
[89]Intersectionality: Crossing the Theoretical and Praxis Divide, supra, note 7.
[90]C. E. Rothenberg, “Diversity and Community: Palestinian Women in Toronto” (1999) 19 Canadian Woman Studies 75.
[91]Ibid. at 76.
[92]G. Rezai-Rashti, “Gender Equity Issues and Minority Students: Connections of Race, Gender and Social Class” (1997) 28 ORBIT: Ontario’s Magazine for Schools 24.
[93]Ibid. at 24.
[94]Ibid. at 25.
[97]C. F. Stychin, “A Postmodern Constitutionalism: Equality Rights, Identity Politics and the Canadian National Imagination” (1994) 17 Dalhousie L. J. 61.
[98]Connecting Intersecting Grounds of Discrimination to Real People’s Real Experiences, supra, note 11.
[99]Touchstones for Change: Equality, Diversity and Accountability, supra, note 82 at 12.
[100]Ibid. at 15.
[101]S. Day & G. Brodsky, ”Women’s Economic Inequality and the Canadian Human Rights Act” (Ottawa: Status of Women Canada, October 1999), online: Status of Women Canada <>.

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